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Abstract In the Nash Demand Game, each of the two players announces the share
he demands of an amount of money that may be split between them. If the demands
can be satisfied, they are; otherwise, neither player receives any money. This game
has many pure-strategy equilibria. This paper characterizes mixed-strategy equilibria.
The condition critical for an equilibrium is that players’ sets of possible demands be
balanced. Two sets of demands are balanced if each demand in one set can be matched
with a demand in the other set such that they sum to one. For Nash’s original game,
a complete characterization is given of the equilibria in which both players’ expected
payoffs are strictly positive. The findings are applied to the private provision of a
discrete public good.
Keywords Nash Demand Game · Divide-the-Dollar Game · Mixed-strategy
equilibria
JEL Classification C72 · C78
1 Introduction
This paper characterizes equilibria in the stylized bargaining model known as the
Nash Demand Game. In the Nash Demand Game, two players have the opportunity
to divide an amount of money between them. For simplicity, this amount is taken to
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be one dollar.1 Players simultaneously announce their demanded shares of the money.
If both demands can be satisfied, then they are; otherwise neither player receives any
money. A player’s payoff is the amount of money he receives.2
There are many pure-strategy equilibria to Nash Demand Game. In particular, for
any s ∈ [0, 1], it is an equilibrium for one player to demand s and the other to demand
1 − s. Such an equilibrium fully distributes the dollar to the players. The only pure-
strategy equilibrium (in undominated strategies) yielding disagreement has each player
demand 1. Such disagreement relies on implausible individual demands and does not
match the observations of disagreement in experiments. And unrealistically, pure-strat-
egy equilibria predict disagreement occurs for sure or not at all. Of course, in the real
world, labor strikes sometimes occur and court cases do not always settle before trial.
Similarly, experimental settings of bargaining games find occasional disagreement.
Over two decades ago, Roth (1985) proposed a focal-point explanation for disagree-
ment in bargaining, arguing that disagreement might naturally arise in the play of a
mixed-strategy equilibrium. In Roth’s experiments, the Nash Demand Game appeared
to have two focal points, and Roth suggested equilibrium disagreement arose as a
failure of the players to coordinate on one of these two pure-strategy equilibria. In
particular, he provided a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each player randomizes
over two distinct demands—and one pair of announced demands more than exhausts
the dollar, resulting in disagreement. Later experimenters also investigated the con-
sequences of multiple focal points in the Nash Demand Game [for surveys see Roth
(1995) and Camerer (2003, Ch. 4)].
The current paper addresses the following question raised by Roth (1985) anal-
ysis: exactly what are the (mixed-strategy) equilibria in the Nash Demand Game?
A key condition is identified: for given equilibrium (mixed) strategies, players’ sets
of possible demands must be balanced. Players’ sets of possible demands are bal-
anced if each demand, s, in one player’s set of possible demands can be matched
with the complementary demand, 1 − s, in the other player’s set of possible demands.
Conversely, if the players’ payoffs are also continuous over the region of agreement,
then (almost) any pair of balanced sets of demands can be a part of an equilibrium in
which players randomize completely over their sets of possible demands. This second
result requires approximating closed sets of possible demands by finite subsets, and
then looking at the limiting case as the finite subsets become dense in the original
sets of demands. Because payoffs are discontinuous (where demands just sum to 1),
techniques used are reminiscent of those used by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) to
establish existence of equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoffs. However,
here existence of equilibrium is not an issue—there are many pure-strategy equilibria.
Rather, the goal is to derive properties of the limiting case from equilibria in the finite
1 For this reason, the game has also been called the Divide-the-Dollar Game.
2 The Nash Demand Game can also be given an exchange interpretation. Suppose a seller has a product
worth nothing to her but worth 1 to the prospective buyer. These values are common knowledge to the buyer
and seller. Simultaneously the seller announces the least price, pS , she is willing to accept for the product,
and the buyer announces the greatest price, pB , he is willing to pay for the product. If pS > pB , no trade
occurs. If pS ≤ pB , then exchange takes place at a price p ∈ [pS , pB ] and the payoff to the seller is p, to
the buyer 1 − p.
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approximations. In this respect, this paper is closer in spirit, for example, to Baye et al.
(1996a,b) who study the mixed-strategy equilibrium of a continuous strategy-space
game as the limit of games with finite strategy sets, thereby deducing properties of the
limiting equilibrium from properties of the finite games. Finally, Nash’s original for-
mulation has each player receive the amount he demands if demands are compatible,
with a player’s utility just being the amount of money received. For this formulation,
a complete characterization is given of the equilibria in which both players’ expected
payoffs are strictly positive. Harsanyi (1973) showed mixed-strategy equilibria of a
full-information game may be viewed as limits of equilibria in nearby games with
private information.3 Thus, the range of mixed-strategy equilibria derived also points
to the richness of equilibria that might be found by incorporating private information
into the Nash Demand Game.
The Nash Demand Game has been a workhorse in bargaining theory. Among the
efficient pure-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game, symmetry identifies the
outcome in which each player demands 1/2. Much of the literature, beginning with
Nash (1950, 1953), has provided additional rationales for this selection, also known as
the Nash bargaining solution.4 While these approaches explain the particular equilib-
rium outcome in which players evenly divide the available money, they do not explain
occasions of disagreement.
Crawford (1982) proposed a two-stage model where disagreement can occur. In
the first stage, players choose to be “cooperative” (not announcing a demand) or to
announce demands. Then in the second stage demands are observed; a player who
has announced a demand has the option of “backing down” at some cost,5 which is
not revealed until the second stage. In this model, equilibrium disagreement can occur
when players announce incompatible demands and then find that they would incur
high costs of backing down. Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) take an approach similar
to Crawford’s by introducing a known cost of commitment but assuming the commit-
ment “sticks” only with some probability less than 1. Equilibrium disagreement can
arise here, too, but only when each player has demanded 1 for himself.
Section 2 below introduces a generalized Nash Demand Game. Section 3 charac-
terizes equilibria in which both players gain from bargaining, relative to disagreement.
3 See Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Kahn and Sun (1995), and Fu (2008) for
the development of the related point that mixed-strategy equilibria in games with private information may
be “purified,” that is, they can be represented by equivalent equilibria in pure strategies.
4 Beyond the Nash (1950) axiomatization, Nash (1953) also presented a “smoothed” game in which the
probability that demands are met decreases rapidly to zero as the sum of demands exceeds 1. Letting the
“amount of smoothing” go to zero, Nash finds the equal division as the limit of the unique equilibrium
outcomes in the smoothed games (see also Binmore 1987). In a similar vein, Carlsson (2003) shows that
if players’ demands are made with a small random error term, then as the size of this error goes to zero
the Nash bargaining solution is obtained as the limit of equilibrium strategies. Anbarci (2001) modifies the
bargaining game so the dollar is still distributed if total demand exceeds 1, but players receive less than
their demands, and the 50–50 split is obtained. Another approach makes the bargaining game dynamic.
Binmore et al. (1986) provide an alternating-offers model in which the Nash bargaining solution is the
equilibrium outcome. Within a random matching model, Santamaria-Garcia (2004) and Robles (2008) take
an evolutionary approach, relating the stable outcome to the Nash bargaining solution.
5 A player might choose to back down if announced demands are incompatible. Nash’s game essentially
assumes such costs are sufficiently large that neither player ever chooses to back down.
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As already noted, the key finding is that players’ sets of demands must be balanced.
Section 4 returns to Nash’s original game and shows that if one player gains nothing
from the bargaining, then even the finding that equilibrium demands are balanced need
not hold.
2 The Nash Demand Game
The Nash Demand Game involving players 1 and 2 is described formally as fol-
lows. Player i receives (von Neumann–Morgenstern) payoff vi (s1, s2) when player 1
demands s1 and player 2 demands s2. For any (s1, s2) ∈ R+ × R+, player i’s realized
payoff ui is
ui (s1, s2) =
{
vi (s1, s2) if s1 + s2 ≤ 1
0 otherwise. (1)
The interpretation is that there exists a fixed sum of money, normalized to 1, that play-
ers may be split between them if they can reach an agreement. Here s1 and s2 represent
players’ demands, and the function ui captures the rule that players get nonzero payoffs
only if demands are compatible in the sense that s1 + s2 ≤ 1. Reservation payoffs in
the case of no agreement are normalized to 0. Note that all demands s > 1 are weakly
dominated by s = 1, and all demands s ∈ (0, 1] are undominated. Therefore, without
loss of interest, henceforth, players’ demands are restricted to the set S ≡ [0, 1].
The functions vi can be interpreted as reflecting both how the dollar is divided,
given (s1, s2), and player i’s resulting value for such a split. For example, we might
have, if players are risk neutral,
vi (s1, s2) = si , (2)
vi (s1, s2) = si + 12 (1 − s1 − s2), (3)





if s1 = 0 and s2 = 0
si
s1 + s2 otherwise;
(4)
and, if players are risk-averse,
vi (s1, s2) = wi (v˜i (s1, s2)) (5)
where wi : R+ → R+ is a continuous strictly increasing concave function and v˜i is
one of the functions of vi in (2)–(4). Specification (2) is Nash (1953)—if demands
are compatible, players receive what they demand, with the possibility some money is
not distributed. Specification (3) is from Roth (1985)—if demands are compatible, then
each player receives his demand plus half of the unclaimed money. Specification (4)
fully distributes the dollar, with players receiving shares proportional to their demands.
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Each player’s set of mixed strategies, , is the set of probability measures on (S,A),
where A is the Borel sigma-algebra on S. If a strategy σ ∈  assigns probability 1 to
a single element s ∈ S, then it is a pure strategy and I may write s instead of σ .
Definition 1 For any σ ∈ , the support of σ is defined as supp(σ ) ≡ { s ∈ S |
∀ε > 0, σ ((s − ε, s + ε) ∩ S) > 0 }; σ completely mixes over the set A ⊂ S if
A = supp(σ ).
If the support A of a strategy is a finite set, then that strategy assigns positive prob-
ability to every element of A. More generally, it can be shown that if σ completely
mixes over A ⊂ S, then A is a compact set. I refer to the support of a mixed strategy as
the set of demands possible under that strategy.6 Allowing for mixed strategies, define
players’ expected payoffs Ui :  ×  → R by
Ui (σ1, σ2) =
∫
S×S
ui (s1, s2) dσ1(s1) dσ2(s2), i = 1, 2. (6)
Definition 2 (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) ∈  ×  is an equilibrium if U1(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) ≥ U1(s1, σ ∗2 ) and
U2(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) ≥ U2(σ ∗1 , s2) ∀s1, s2 ∈ S.
This definition of equilibrium only requires no player can improve his payoff by using
any particular pure strategy. Because the Ui are linear in the probabilities, this is equiv-
alent to requiring no player has another mixed strategy that increases his payoff [see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 11)].
N.B. Throughout I assume v1 and v2 satisfy Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 The functions v1 and v2 have the following properties:
(i) vi : S × S → R+ is Borel measurable.
(ii) v1(s, 0) > v1(0, 0) and v2(0, s) > v2(0, 0) for all s > 0.
(iii) v1(s1, s2) is nonincreasing in s2, nondecreasing in s1 if s2 = 0, and strictly
increasing in s1 if s2 > 0; v2(s1, s2) is nonincreasing in s1, nondecreasing in
s2 if s1 = 0, and strictly increasing in s2 if s1 > 0.
Assumption 1(i) is a technical assumption ensuring expected payoffs are well-
defined. Assumption 1(ii) implies both players announcing a demand of zero is not a
pure-strategy equilibrium. Assumption 1(iii) implies players’ interests are opposed—
if a pair of demands sums to less than one, then a player can gain by increasing his
demand and this does not help (and possibly hurts) his rival. Functions (2)–(5) satisfy
Assumption 1.
6 While this use of the word “possible” is correct when A is a finite set, it can be imprecise when A is
infinite. For example, consider the set of demands A ≡ {1/n | n = 1, 2, 3, . . .}∪{0} together with a strategy
such that σ(1/n) > 0 for all n and
∑
n σ(1/n) = 1. Then demand 0 is in the support of σ but it is not in
any sense “possible” under strategy σ . As a second example, consider a probability measure that assigns
strictly positive probability to each rational number in [0, 1] and for which the total mass of the rationals
in this interval is 1. Then no irrational number is a possible demand under this strategy even though the
support of the strategy is [0, 1]. Having noted this imprecision, I will continue to use “possible demands”
as shorthand for “the support of a player’s distribution of demands.”
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3 Equilibria in the Nash Demand Game
The equilibria defined above can be termed mixed-strategy equilibria (MSE) as each
player’s strategy is an element of , the set of mixed strategies. If (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is an
equilibrium and the supports of σ ∗1 and σ ∗2 are singletons, then (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) can further
be identified as a pure-strategy equilibrium (PSE). The set of PSE to this game is
{(s1, s2) ∈ S × S | s1 + s2 = 1 or s1 = s2 = 1} . Any equilibrium that is not a PSE I
will refer to as a proper MSE. The strategy pair (s1, s2) = (1, 1) is the only PSE that
yields disagreement. Arguably, such demands are unrealistic for either player as they
ensure the other player a payoff of zero—and one might expect a player not to enter
into the game if he expects no gain. In contrast, proper mixed strategy equilibria are
significant in that they offer a possible explanation for disagreement while relying on
demands that are more plausible as they offer potential benefits to both players.
The characterizations of equilibria in this section do not distinguish between PSE
and proper MSE. The PSE were already noted above, so the value of these character-
izations is that they also apply to proper MSE. I begin with an example in which both
players completely mix over two distinct demands.
Example 1 Suppose vi (s1, s2) = si , i = 1, 2. Let a ∈ (0, 1/2) be given and define
A ≡ {a, 1 − a}. The unique equilibrium in which each player completely mixes over
A has each player use strategy σ ∗, where7
σ ∗(a) = a
1 − a and σ
∗(1 − a) = 1 − 2a
1 − a . (7)
For example, if a = 1/3 then the corresponding MSE has each player demand either
1/3 or 2/3, each with probability 1/2. The equilibrium can be understood as follows.
If player 2 uses mixed strategy σ ∗, then for each of player 1’s possible demands, s1,
player 1’s expected payoff is
U1(s1, σ ∗) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
s1 if 0 ≤ s1 ≤ a
a
1 − a s1 if a < s1 ≤ 1 − a
0 if 1 − a < s1 ≤ 1.
Over the interval [0, a], U1(s1, σ ∗) is strictly increasing in s1 and attains its maximum
value of a at s1 = a. Similarly, over the interval (a, 1 − a], U1(s1, σ ∗) attains its
maximum value of a at s1 = 1−a. And over the interval (1−a, 1], U1(s1, σ ∗) equals
zero, which is strictly less than a. Thus, both s1 = a and s1 = 1 − a are player 1’s
best responses to player 2’s mixed strategy, so player 1 is willing to randomize over
these two demands. Similarly, player 2 is willing to randomize over A if player 1 uses
strategy σ ∗. Thus, (σ ∗, σ ∗) is an equilibrium in which each player completely mixes
over A. To establish uniqueness, let (σˆ1, σˆ2) be any equilibrium in which each player
completely mixes over A (= {a, 1 − a}). Player 1’s expected payoff is U1(a, σˆ2) = a
when demanding a and U1(1 − a, σˆ2) = (1 − a)σˆ2(a) when demanding 1 − a. To
7 I harmlessly abuse notation by writing σ∗(a) rather than σ∗({a}). Such abuse continues where convenient.
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Fig. 1 Each player’s expected demand in Examples 1 and 3
ensure player 1 is willing to randomize over these two possible demands, these payoffs
must be equal, that is, a = U1(a, σˆ2) = U1(1−a, σˆ2) = (1−a)σˆ2(a), which implies
σˆ2(a) = a/(1 − a). Because A has only two elements, σˆ2 assigns the complementary
probability to 1−a; that is, σˆ2(1−a) = 1− σˆ2(a) = (1−2a)/(1−a). Thus, σˆ2 = σ ∗
as given in (7). Similarly, σˆ1 = σ ∗, thus establishing uniqueness.
For a given value of a, the MSE results in disagreement if and only if both players
demand 1 − a, and this occurs with probability (1 − 2a)2/(1 − a)2, which decreases
monotonically from 1 to 0 as a increases from 0 to 1/2.8 As a increases from 0 toward
1/2, the payoff to demanding a, namely a, is increasing. In this MSE, the payoff to
demanding 1 − a must also be increasing in a. But since 1 − a decreases with a, this
can happen only if the probability of agreement goes up, that is, the probability of











= 1 − 3a(1 − a)
1 − a .
Figure 1 depicts the expected demand, s¯1, which is not monotonic in a. Between the
two possibilities, a and 1−a, a player assigns greater probability to the lower number
if and only if 1/3 < a < 1/2.
The notable feature of Example 1 is that in equilibrium each possible demand by
player 1 is balanced by a possible demand of player 2 that fully allocates the dollar.
This feature does not require players’ sets of possible demands to be identical, as
assumed in Example 1.
8 As a → 0, the MSE approaches the PSE in which each player announces s = 1, which results in dis-
agreement with probability one. As a → 1/2, the MSE approaches the PSE in which each player announces
s = 1/2, which results in agreement with probability one.
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Definition 3 The sets A and B are balanced if the following is satisfied: s ∈ A ⇐⇒
1 − s ∈ B.
Derivation of MSE will generally be difficult, with equilibrium strategies depend-
ing on the particular choices of functions v1 and v2. As an alternative, I ask what sets
of possible demands can arise in a MSE. Knowing which sets of demands are com-
patible with equilibrium is an essential first step in solving for equilibrium strategies.
The critical property of players’ sets of possible demands is that they be balanced,
regardless of the functions v1 and v2 considered, as long as they satisfy Assumption 1.
Proposition 1 Let A and B be nonempty closed subsets of [0, 1] such that 1 /∈ A∪ B.
If (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is an equilibrium in which σ ∗1 completely mixes over A and σ ∗2 completely
mixes over B, then A and B are balanced.
The proof of Proposition 1 and proofs of subsequent propositions are in the Appen-
dix. Proposition 1 is proven by showing that if a ∈ A but 1 − a /∈ B, then rather
than ever demanding a, player 1 could demand a + ε, for some small ε > 0, without
increasing the chance of disagreement. Such an increase would raise player 1’s payoff.
Therefore, if in equilibrium player 1 fully mixes over A, then it must be that 1−a ∈ B.
The condition 1 /∈ A ∪ B in Proposition 1 is needed to exclude the PSE in which each
player demands 1 with probability one—the sets A = B = {1} are not balanced.
Players using balanced sets of demands can also be interpreted as independent
attempts to choose among a given set of PSE. Suppose A and B are balanced sets
of demands for players 1 and 2, respectively. The set C ≡ {(s, 1 − s) | s ∈ A} is
simply the set of PSE in which player 1’s strategy belongs to A. Because A and B are
balanced, B coincides with the set of strategies player 2 uses in the PSE in C . Thus,
an equilibrium in which player 1 completely mixes over A and player 2 completely
mixes over B may interpreted as players realizing an equilibrium in C should be
implemented, but coordination failure leaves them independently randomizing over
their sets of pure strategies associated with C . This is the natural extension of players’
failure to coordinate on one of two equilibria in Roth’s experiments described above
(see also Example 2 below).
The following proposition provides the converse to Proposition 1 for the case
in which sets A and B are finite. This result is key to proving the converse of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Let A and B be nonempty finite subsets of [0, 1] such that 1 /∈ A ∪ B.
If the sets A and B are balanced, then there exists a unique equilibrium in which
player 1 completely mixes over A and player 2 completely mixes over B.
The condition 1 /∈ A ∪ B in Proposition 2 is needed to exclude the case in which
A = B = {0, 1}. These sets are balanced, but if v1(0, 1) = v2(1, 0) = 0 (as in (2)),
then there is no MSE in which both players completely mix over {0, 1}.9 Propositions 1
and 2 yield the following corollary.
9 However, if v1(0, 1) > 0 and v2(1, 0) > 0, then there is indeed an equilibrium in which each player
completely mixes over {0, 1}. This issue is discussed further in Sect. 4.
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Fig. 2 The matrix game

























Corollary 1 Let A and B be nonempty finite subsets of [0, 1] such that 1 /∈ A ∪ B.
There exists an equilibrium in which player 1 completely mixes over A and player 2
completely mixes over B if and only if the sets A and B are balanced. If such an
equilibrium exists, it is unique.
The intuition for uniqueness of equilibrium in Corollary 1 can be understood by
considering A = {a j }nj=1, where 0 < a1 < a2 < · · · < an−1 < an < 1. For
demands to be balanced, player 2’s set of demands is B = {1 − an, . . . , 1 − a1}.
Let u¯2 > 0 denote player 2’s payoff at equilibrium (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) that completely mixes
over A and B. Now suppose player 2 demands 1 − a1; the only chance for agreement
is if player 1 demands a1, and player 2’s willingness to make this demand requires
u¯2 = U2(σ ∗1 , 1 − a1) = v2(a1, 1 − a1)σ ∗1 (a1), which determines σ ∗1 (a1). If player 2
makes the second-highest demand in B, namely 1−a2, the only possibilities for agree-
ment are if player 1 demands either a1 or a2. We have already determined σ ∗1 (a1), so
the condition
u¯2 = U2(σ ∗1 , 1 − a2) = v2(a1, 1 − a2)σ ∗1 (a1) + v2(a2, 1 − a2)σ ∗1 (a2)
uniquely determines σ ∗1 (a2). Descending in this manner through the set of player 2’s
demands uniquely determines σ ∗1 . Similarly, σ ∗2 is uniquely determined.
In the following example, players randomize over balanced but nonidentical sets
of demands.
Example 2 (Roth 1985) Suppose v1 and v2 are given by (3). Let a ∈ (0, 1/2) be given
and define A ≡ {a, 1/2} and B ≡ {1/2, 1 − a}. The sets A and B are balanced. The
associated 2 × 2 matrix game is shown in Fig. 2, and the unique completely mixed
equilibrium is readily found to be (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ), where
σ ∗1 (a) =
2






σ ∗2 (1/2) =
4a
1 + 2a σ
∗
2 (1 − a) =
1 − 2a
1 + 2a .
Proposition 2 implies (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is the unique MSE in which player 1 completely
mixes over A and player 2 completely mixes over B. It is interesting to note that in
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Fig. 3 Demands and payoffs in the Roth example
contrast to Examples 1 and 3 (below), in Example 2 the probability of disagreement,
(1 − 2a)2/(3 + 4a − 4a2), does not exceed 1/3. That the probability of disagreement
is bounded away from 1 can be understood as follows.
Figure 3 depicts demand and payoff combinations Roth’s example. The possible
combinations of demands are represented by the intersections of the four dashed lines.
The strictly positive payoff possibilities are represented by the shaded circles (here
the demand pair (a, 1/2) is marked by the black box and the corresponding pair of
payoffs is the shaded circle lying to the northeast). The only demand combination for
which players’ payoffs are zero is shown by the unshaded circle. Notice that player 2,
by demanding 1/2 can assure agreement and his expected payoff will be at least 1/2.
This is true for all a ∈ (0, 1/2). Now, as a decreases toward 0, payoff combinations
labeled α and β move northwest and player 2’s expected payoff is bounded away
from 0 (in fact, it is sure to exceed 1/2), and the realized payoff is uniformly bounded
above. Therefore, the probability of disagreement must be bounded away from 1, even
as a decreases toward 0.
Depicting Example 1 in a similar diagram, one quickly sees why the probability of
disagreement ranges over the full interval [0, 1]. The analogous argument also applies
in Example 3 below where players completely mix over the interval [a, 1 − a] and
the probability of disagreement varies from 0 to 1. Furthermore, if instead, say, play-
ers completely mix over the intervals A = [a, 1/2] and B = [1/2, 1 − a], where
a ∈ (0, 1/2), it readily follows that the probability of disagreement is bounded away
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from 1.10 This reasoning does not depend on the set of conceivable payoff combinations
having a linear frontier or even being convex. To keep the probability of disagreement
bounded away from 1, the key is that one player’s set of possible payoffs remains
bounded away from 0. This point is discussed further following Example 5.
To extend Proposition 2 to general closed sets A and B, I approximate A and B by
finite balanced subsets. For these finite approximations, Proposition 2 ensures exis-
tence of a unique equilibrium with strategies completely mixed over the balanced sets.
The general case is treated as the limit of finite approximations. To extend results from
the finite case, I must assume the payoffs are sufficiently continuous. The following
suffices.
Assumption 2 The functions v1 and v2 are continuous on (0, 1] × (0, 1].
Functions (2)–(4) satisfy Assumption 2.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 2 is satisfied. Let A and B be nonempty closed
subsets of [0, 1] such that 1 /∈ A ∪ B. If the sets A and B are balanced, then there
exists an equilibrium (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) in which σ ∗1 completely mixes over A and σ ∗2 completely
mixes over B.
Propositions 1 and 3 yield the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose Assumption 2 is satisfied. Let A and B be nonempty closed
subsets of [0, 1] such that 1 /∈ A ∪ B. There exists an equilibrium in which player 1
completely mixes over A and player 2 completely mixes over B if and only if the sets
A and B are balanced.
The equilibria of Corollary 2 are quasi-strong (Harsanyi 1973); that is, the support of
each player’s equilibrium strategy contains all of the pure-strategy best responses to
the rival’s equilibrium strategy.
Inefficiency of equilibria is common, and it arises here when there is a positive
probability of disagreement. Suppose the functions v1 and v2 satisfy the following
condition:
∀ a, b ∈ [0, 1] and ∀ ε > 0, ∃δ < ε/2 s.t. vi (a + δ, b + δ) > vi (a, b), i = 1, 2.
(8)
This condition simply requires that a player value his own (incremental) gain more
strongly than the other’s. Consider any equilibrium (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) of Corollary 2, and let
a = min{a | a ∈ A}, a¯ = max{a | a ∈ A} and b = min{b | b ∈ B}, and u¯i ≡
Ui (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ), i = 1, 2. Because u¯1 > 0, it must be that b is an atom of σ ∗2 ; similarly, a
must be an atom of σ ∗1 . Consequently,
u¯1 = U1(a, σ ∗2 ) = E
[
v1(a, s2) | σ ∗2
] ≤ v1(a, b),
10 The equilibrium in this continuous version of Roth’s example is derived in the Appendix. The probability
of disagreement is shown to equal 1 − (√a + √1 − a)/√2.
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where the second equality follows because agreement is sure to occur, and the inequal-
ity follows because v1 is nonincreasing in b; similarly, u¯2 ≤ v2(a, b). If A contains at
least two elements, then we also have 1 − (a + b) = 1 − (a + 1 − a¯) = (a¯ − a) > 0,
where the first equality follows by balancedness. By (8) it now follows that there is
δ ∈ (0, (a¯ − a)/2)) such that if players announce (a +δ, b+δ), then demands will be
satisfied and both players will enjoy payoffs greater than at (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ). Thus, (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 )
is inefficient.
With Corollary 2, we see there is now a simple two-step procedure to constructing
equilibria where both players benefit. First, players’ balanced sets of demands are
chosen—and for this step utilities are not relevant. Second, equilibrium probabilities
over these sets of demands are determined—and here the particular utility functions
are used. When players’ payoff functions vi depend on only their own demands, this
characterization is straightforward, as shown next in Proposition 4. For this charac-
terization it is convenient to introduce the cumulative distribution function associated
with a mixed strategy. For any σ ∈ , the associated cumulative distribution function
(cdf), F , is defined by F(s) ≡ σ ( (−∞, s] ), for all real numbers s; note that F(s) = 0
for all s < 0 and F(s) = 1 for all s ≥ 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose vi (s1, s2) = wi (si ), where wi : R+ → R+ is continuous and
strictly increasing on R++, i = 1, 2. Let A and B be balanced nonempty closed sub-
sets of [0, 1] such that 1 /∈ A ∪ B. Define a ≡ min{ a | a ∈ A }, a¯ ≡ max{ a | a ∈ A },
b ≡ min{ b | b ∈ B }, and b¯ ≡ max{ b | b ∈ B }. Then the unique equilibrium
(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) in which σ ∗1 completely mixes over A and σ ∗2 completely mixes over B is




0 if s < a
w2(b)











0 if s < b
w1(a)





w1(1 − b) if s > b and s /∈ B.
(10)
Complementing Example 1, the next example has players completely mix over an
interval of demands.
Example 3 Suppose vi (s1, s2) = si , i = 1, 2. Let a ∈ (0, 1/2] be given and define
A ≡ [a, 1 − a]. Proposition 3 implies the unique equilibrium in which each player
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completely mixes over A has each player announce a demand according to the cumu-




0 if s < a
a
1 − s if a ≤ s ≤ 1 − a
1 if 1 − a < s ≤ 1,
which on the interval (a, 1 − a] has the corresponding density function f (s) =
a(1−s)−2. In this MSE, a player demands a with probability a/(1−a) and announces
a demand from (a, 1−a] according to density f . If player 1, say, announces demand a
there is sure to be agreement. So, suppose player 1 announces demand s ∈ (a, 1 − a].
There is disagreement if and only if player 2 demands more than 1 − s, which occurs
with probability 1−F(1−s); because player 1’s demand s > a is distributed according










1 − (1 − s)
)
a


















where log(x) denotes the natural logarithm of x . The probability of disagreement
decreases monotonically from 1 to 0 as a increases from 0 to 1/2. Each player’s
expected demand equals
s¯3(a) = a F(a) +
1−a∫
a
s f (s) ds
= a
2
1 − a +
[
a
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The pattern of the expected demand, depicted in Fig. 1, is similar to that in Exam-
ple 1. Furthermore, for every a ∈ (0, 1/2), the probability of disagreement and the
expected demand are strictly less in Example 3 than in Example 1. This occurs because,
although the equilibrium strategies of Examples 1 and 3 assign the same probability
to the demand a, Example 1 concentrates the remaining probability at 1 − a, while
Example 3 distributes it continuously over the interval (a, 1 − a]. The equilibrium
strategies may be interpreted as follows. Each player demands a for sure, and then
with (independent) probability 1−2a1−a asks for a little more. In Example 1 this “some-
thing extra” is 1−2a, and disagreement occurs if both players ask for something extra.
In Example 3, this “something extra” is drawn from the interval (0, 1−2a]; therefore,
some extra demands can still be accommodated without exceeding the allotment of 1,
and so disagreement need not occur. Thus, the probability of disagreement is less in
Example 3 than in Example 1. Similarly, because with probability 1 the extra amount
demanded in Example 3 is less than that in Example 3, it follows that the expected
demand is less in Example 3 than in Example 1. Similar patterns can be seen in the
continuous version of Roth’s example (see the Appendix).
This section concludes with an example that illustrates mixed-strategy equilibria
that can arise in the provision of a discrete public good, even in the presence complete
information.
Example 4 (Private provision of a public good) Suppose a public good will be pro-
vided if citizens’ contributions fully fund it. There are two citizens, 1 and 2. Suppose
person i’s strictly positive private value for the good is ui , i = 1, 2. Assume the cost
of the good is 1, where u1 + u2 > 1. Let ci denote player i’s contribution. If contribu-
tions total at least 1, the good is provided; if not, contributions are refunded. Suppose
citizen i’s payoff is vi = ui − ci if the good is provided and 0 otherwise. There are no
sidepayments between players. The foregoing is common knowledge. This example
allows players to make any nonnegative contributions; Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984)
studied this game for the case in which players’ contributions are either 0 or some
fixed positive amount.
The equilibria of this game can be described by recasting it as a Nash demand game.
The achievable total surplus is U0 ≡ u1 +u2 −1 > 0. Without sidepayments, players
conceivably might demand payoffs si ∈ [0, ui ]; given demand si , player i’s corre-
sponding willingness to contribute is ci = ui − si . For simplicity, I restrict attention to
equilibria in which both players earn strictly positive expected payoffs. A pair of utility
demands, (s1, s2), is balanced if U0 = s1 + s2, which is equivalent to c1 + c2 = 1.
Now focus on contributions, and define
C1 ≡ (1 − u2, u1) ∩ [0, 1] and C2 ≡ (1 − u1, u2) ∩ [0, 1].
In equilibrium, player 1 would not contribute more than 1; and to earn a positive payoff
he must contribute less than u1. At the same time, if player 2 is to earn a positive payoff,
player 1 must contribute more than 1 − u2 (if player 1 contributes less, he knows the
good will be underfunded and so his payoff will be zero). These considerations imply
that if equilibrium payoffs are to be positive, then player 1’s possible contributions
will be in set C1; analogous considerations apply to player 2 and C2.
123
Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game 257
By the assumptions in the first paragraph of this example, C1 and C2 are nonempty
nondegenerate intervals. Moreover, these intervals are balanced. Let A be a nonempty
closed subset of C1 and B a nonempty closed subset of C2. The earlier analysis shows
that if the sets A and B are balanced, then there exists a unique equilibrium (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 )
in which σ ∗1 completely mixes over A and σ ∗2 completely mixes over B. If set A has
more than one element, the equilibrium will be inefficient as there is positive proba-
bility the good is not provided. Finally, just considering players’ randomization over
intervals, because C1 is a nondegenerate interval, there are (uncountably) many non-
degenerate closed intervals within C1 so there are (uncountably) many nondegenerate
mixed-strategy equilibria to this game.
4 Mixed-strategy equilibria when one player gains nothing
The preceding analysis characterized equilibria in which neither player’s strategy had
1 in its support. This condition was sufficient for players’ equilibrium payoffs to be
strictly positive. This condition is not always needed—for example, in Example 2, we
can allow a = 0, so players completely mix over A = {0, 1/2} and B = {1/2, 1}.
This is possible because player 1 can obtain a positive payoff even when demanding 0.
Indeed, with some caveats, one could recast most of the analysis of the previous sec-
tion as characterizing equilibria in which each player’s payoff exceeds his payoff at
the disagreement outcome. This section explores the possibilities for equilibria when
one player is sure to get the disagreement payoff. The reader may find, as I do, these
equilibria highly implausible—why would one player even venture into the game if he
expects, with probability one, not to do better than the disagreement outcome? Never-
theless, for completeness this section investigates what can be said about the behavior
of such a player. We saw in Sect. 3 that when both players gain from the bargaining,
their sets of possible demands must be balanced. In contrast, when one player does
not gain, balancedness of strategies no longer applies and equilibrium randomization
over given sets of demands need not be unique.
For simplicity, throughout this section I assume the payoff functions are
vi (s1, s2) = si , as assumed by Nash (1953). We will see that if one player expects no
gain, then the other must be demanding 1 with probability 1. Furthermore, a series of
examples will show that if one player demands 1 for sure, then for the other player any
closed set of demands containing 0 can be supported in equilibrium as that player’s set
of possible demands. The next proposition shows that if 1 is in the support of either
player’s strategy, then at least one player demands 1 with probability one.
Proposition 5 Suppose vi (s1, s2) = si , i = 1, 2. Suppose (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is an equilibrium
in which σ ∗1 completely mixes over A and σ ∗2 completely mixes over B.
1. If 1 ∈ A and 1 /∈ B, then σ ∗1 (1) = 1.
2. If 1 /∈ A and 1 ∈ B, then σ ∗2 (1) = 1.
3. If 1 ∈ A and 1 ∈ B, then σ ∗1 (1) = 1 or σ ∗2 (1) = 1.
The logic behind the proof of Proposition 5 can be seen by considering part 1 for
the case in which 1 is an atom of σ ∗1 , i.e., σ ∗1 (1) > 0. Because 1 /∈ B it follows that
there is some demand that yields player 1 a positive payoff; hence, U1(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) > 0.
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Because U1(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) > 0 and 1 is an atom of σ ∗1 , it now follows that 0 is an atom of
B, implying U2(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) = 0. For there to be no demand yielding player 2 a positive
payoff, it must be that σ ∗1 (1) = 1.
The remainder of this section shows when one player, say player 1, demands 1,
little more can be said about the equilibrium sets of demands. The following examples
culminate in showing that player 1’s certain demand of 1 can be “rationalized” by an
equilibrium strategy for player 2 that completely mixes over any closed subset B of
[0, 1] that contains 0. Moreover, there are infinitely many equilibrium strategies in
which player 2 has this same set of possible demands.
I begin this progression of examples by showing that if one player demands 1 for
sure, then balancedness of the supports and uniqueness of the equilibrium (with those
supports) is no longer assured. The following example shows that there are infinitely
many equilibria in which one player demands 1 for sure and the other completely
mixes over [0, 1].
Example 5 Suppose vi (s1, s2) = si , i = 1, 2. Define mixed strategies σ ∗1 and σ ∗2,t as
follows. For player 1, σ ∗1 (1) = 1. For player 2 the cdf, Ft , associated with σ ∗2,t is
Ft (s) = t1 − (1 − t)s if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,
where t ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that specifies the probability with which player 2
announces a demand of 0. Because player 1 demands 1 for sure, player 2 earns a
payoff of 0 regardless of his own demand. In particular, for player 2 the cdf Ft is a best
response to player 1’s demand. To see player 1’s strategy is the unique best response
to σ ∗2,t , observe that for any s < 1,
U1(1, σ ∗2,t ) − U1(s, σ ∗2,t ) = t − s Ft (1 − s) =
(1 − s)t2
s + (1 − s)t > 0.
Here supp(σ ∗1 ) = {1} and supp(σ ∗2,t ) = [0, 1], so, while (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2,t ) is an equilibrium,
the players’ sets of possible demands are not balanced. Moreover, {(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2,t )}t∈(0,1)
represents an infinite set of equilibria in which player 1 demands 1 for sure and player 2
completely mixes over [0, 1]. The probability of disagreement is 1 − t .
When player 1 demands 1 for himself, the equilibrium probability of agreement
can lie anywhere in the interval [0, 1]. To see this, first observe that, because in Exam-
ple 5 the parameter t is the probability of agreement, the equilibrium probability of
agreement can lie anywhere in (0, 1). Alternatively, if player 2 demands 0 for sure,
then the probability of agreement is 1; if he demands 1 for sure, it is 0.
The following example shows that there are also infinitely many equilibria in which
one player demands 1 for sure and the other player completely mixes over the interval
[0, 1 − p], where p ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter.
Example 6 Suppose vi (s1, s2) = si , i = 1, 2. Fix p ∈ (0, 1) and define mixed strate-
gies σ ∗1 and σ ∗2,t as follows. For player 1, σ ∗1 (1) = 1. For player 2 the cdf, Ft , associated
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with σ ∗2,t is given as follows:
Ft (s) =
⎧⎨
⎩ p + (1 − p)
(
ps
(1 − p)(1 − s)
)t
if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 − p
1 if 1 − p < s ≤ 1,
where t > 1 is a parameter. Player 2’s strategy is obviously a best response to player 1’s.
To see player 1’s strategy is a best response to σ ∗2,t , first observe all demands s ≤ p are
sure to be satisfied, so among these player 1’s best choice is s = p, with U1(p, Ft ) = p.
A demand s = 1 is equally as good as s = p: U1(1, Ft ) = 1×Ft (0) = p = U1(p, Ft ).
Next observe that for any p < s < 1,
U1(s, σ ∗2,t ) = s Ft (1 − s)











where (11) follows because 0 < p(1−s)
(1−p)s < 1 and t > 1. Thus, player 1’s best responses
to Ft are s = 1 and s = p. Consequently, (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2,t ) is an equilibrium, with supp(σ ∗1 ) ={1} and supp(σ ∗2,t ) = [0, 1 − p]. These supports are not balanced, and because there
is such an equilibrium for every t ∈ (0, 1), there are infinitely many equilibria with
these supports. Note that player 2’s strategy places mass p on demand 0, so p is also
the probability of agreement.
Building on the two previous examples, the final example shows for any closed set
B ⊂ [0, 1] with 0 ∈ B, there is an equilibrium in which one player demands 1 for
sure and the other completely mixes over B.
Example 7 Suppose vi (s1, s2) = si , i = 1, 2. Let A = {1} and let B be any nonempty
closed subset of [0, 1] with 0 ∈ B. Then there exists a MSE in which player 1 com-
pletely mixes over A and player 2 completely mixes over B. Moreover, if B contains
at least two points, then there exist infinitely many such equilibria.
This conclusion can be understood as follows. If B contains only one point it must
be 0, so the PSE in which player 1 demands 1 and player 2 demands 0 is the unique
equilibrium. If instead B contains at least 2 points, let p be such that 1 − p is the
greatest element of B. It follows from Examples 5 and 6 that there are infinitely many
equilibria in which player 1 demands 1 for sure and player 2 completely mixes over
















Fig. 4 Constructing G from F
Figure 4 shows the relationship between cdfs F and G. Then supp(G)= B, and because
G(0) = F(0) but otherwise shifts probability to higher values (in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance), it follows that 1 and p are player 1’s best responses to G.
Thus, it is an equilibrium for player 1 to demand 1 and player 2 to announce a demand
according to G. Because this procedure is applicable to each of the infinitely many
equilibrium cdfs completely mixed over [0, 1 − p], it follows that there are infinitely
many equilibria in which player 1 announces 1 and player 2 completely mixes over
B. Note that only for the case of B = [0, 1] is the equilibrium quasi-strong.
5 Conclusion
The literature on bargaining has focused on pure-strategy equilibria. Of these, the
Nash bargaining solution commands center stage. Nevertheless, in the Nash Demand
Game, there exists an abundance of proper mixed-strategy equilibria, which allow
for equilibrium outcomes of agreement or disagreement. This paper has shown such
equilibria can be constructed in two steps. First, players’ sets of possible demands are
chosen to be balanced, and if we exclude 1 from these sets then payoffs are sure to be
larger in equilibrium than the disagreement payoff. Second, each player’s probability
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distribution over his set of possible demands is determined by the condition that the
other player be willing to play each of his possible demands. It was shown that almost
any set of balanced demands can support a mixed-strategy equilibrium, yielding any
probability of disagreement between 0 and 1.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is an equilibrium in which σ ∗1 completely
mixes over A and σ ∗2 completely mixes over B. Assumption 1 and 1 /∈ A ∪ B imply
σ ∗i (0) < 1, i = 1, 2. I now show s ∈ A ⇒ 1 − s ∈ B. The symmetric condition
“s ∈ B ⇒ 1 − s ∈ A” is proven analogously.
Suppose the proposition is false; in particular, suppose there exists a′ ∈ A such
that 1 − a′ /∈ B. Because B is closed and 0 < a′ < 1, there exists ε > 0 such that
0 < a′ − 2ε, a′ + 2ε < 1, and (1 − a′ − 2ε, 1 − a′ + 2ε) ∩ B = ∅, implying
σ ∗2
([1 − a′ − ε, 1 − a′ + ε]) = 0. Consider any s′′ ∈ (a′ − ε, a′ + ε):










′ + ε, s2) dσ ∗2 (s2)
( (by 1): u1(a′ + ε, s2) = 0






′ + ε, s2) dσ ∗2 (s2) (σ ∗2
(





′′, s2) dσ ∗2 (s2)
( (Assumption 1(iii), a′ + ε > s′′
and σ ∗2 (0) < 1)
)
= U1(s′′, σ ∗2 ). (definition of U1)
Thus, U1(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) > U1(s′′, σ ∗2 ) for all s′′ ∈ (a′ − ε, a′ + ε). Therefore, an optimal
strategy for player 1 cannot assign positive probability to any subset of (a′−ε, a′+ε);
that is, σ ∗1
(
(a′ − ε, a′ + ε)) = 0; but this contradicts the assumption that a′ ∈ A =
supp(σ ∗1 ). Therefore, a′ ∈ A ⇒ 1 − a′ ∈ B. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2. The assumptions that A and B are nonempty and balanced
imply there is an integer n ≥ 1 such that A and B both have n distinct elements. The
case of n = 1 is obviously a PSE with balanced demands. For the remainder of the
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proof, suppose n ≥ 2. The sets A and B may be written as A ≡ {a1, a2, . . . , an} and
B ≡ {b1, b2, . . . , bn}, where a1 < a2 < · · · < an < 1 and b1 < b2 < · · · < bn < 1.
Balancedness implies a1 = 1 − bn and b1 = 1 − an ; given 1 /∈ A ∪ B, it follows that
a1 > 0 and b1 > 0.
I now derive player 2’s unique strategy that leaves player 1 willing to completely
mix over A. Consider the following system of equations:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
v1(a1, b1) v1(a1, b2) . . . v1(a1, bn−1) v1(a1, bn)
v1(a2, b1) v1(a2, b2) . . . v1(a2, bn−1) 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v1(an−1, b1) v1(an−1, b2) 0 . . . 0























Because a j > 0 and b j > 0 ∀ j , Assumption 1(iii) implies v1(ai , b j ) > 0 ∀i, j =
1, . . . , n. Denote by V the n × n matrix in (12). The determinant of V is nonzero:
| det(V ) | = ∏nk=1 v1(an+1−k, bk) > 0. Thus, V is invertible. Hence, there exists a
unique vector q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) that solves (12).





v1(an+1−k, b j ) q j , k = 1, 2, . . . , n. (13)
I show by induction that q j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , n. Consider (13) for k = 1:1 =
v1(an, b1)q1, so q1 > 0. Suppose it has been shown that q j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , k.












v1(an+1−k, b j ) q j + v1(an+1−(k+1), bk+1) qk+1 (14)
= 1 + v1(an+1−(k+1), bk+1) qk+1, (15)
where (14) follows from Assumption 1(iii) and an+1−k > an+1−(k+1); (15) follows
from (13). Consequently, v1(an+1−(k+1), bk+1) qk+1 > 0, which in turn implies
qk+1 > 0. Therefore, q j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , n. Now for player 2 define the mixed
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strategy σ ∗2 as follows:
σ ∗2 (b j ) = q j/
n∑
i=1
qi j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (16)
Because q j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , n, it follows that σ ∗2 is completely mixed over B.
From (16) and (13) it follows that
U1(a, σ ∗2 ) = 1/
n∑
i=1
qi ∀a ∈ A.
To see player 1 is willing to completely mix over A, it remains to show that player 1
finds demands outside A are inferior to those in A. But this follows from exactly the
same reasoning as in Example 1. For all s > an disagreement is certain, so U1(s, σ ∗2 ) =
0 ∀s > an . Because A and B are balanced, the payoff U1(s, σ ∗2 ) is strictly increasing
in s over the interval [0, a1] and over each of the intervals (a j−1, a j ], j = 2, . . . , n;
over each of these intervals U1(s, σ ∗2 ) is maximized at the right endpoint, which is
itself an element of A. Thus, U1(s, σ ∗2 ) < 1/
∑n
i=1 qi ∀s /∈ A.
The foregoing analysis shows that under the assumptions of the proposition there
exists a unique strategy σ ∗2 ∈  that is completely mixed over B and leaves player 1
willing to play any strategy that is mixed over A. A similar argument shows there exists
a unique strategy σ ∗1 ∈  that is completely mixed over A and leaves player 2 willing
to play any strategy that is mixed over B. Then (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is the unique equilibrium in
which player 1 completely mixes over A and player 2 completely mixes over B. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3. For convenience, I gather three facts from probability theory.
Let X be a nonempty compact subset of a Euclidean space and let AX be the Borel
sigma-algebra on X . If a sequence of probability measures (μn)n on (X,AX ) con-
verges to a limit μ0 in the topology of weak convergence, I denote this by μn w−→ μ0.
In the statement of these facts, (μn)n and μ0 are probability measures on (X,AX ).
[References are as follows: Fact 1, Billingsley (1999, Ch. 1.5), Fact 2, Billingsley
(1999, p. 24), and Fact 3, Loève (1977, Ch. 12.1.)]
Fact 1 For any sequence (μn)n , there exists a subsequence (μnk )k and a probability
measure μ0 such that μnk w−→ μ0.
Fact 2 If h : X →R is upper-semicontinuous and if μn w−→μ0, then∫
h dμ0 ≥ lim sup ∫ h dμn .
Fact 3 Suppose h : X → R and let D denote the set of points of discontinuity of h.
If μ0(D) = 0 and μn w−→ μ0, then lim ∫ h dμn exists and lim ∫ h dμn =∫
h dμ0.
Define a ≡ min{ a | a ∈ A }, a¯ ≡ max{ a | a ∈ A }, b ≡ min{ b | b ∈ B }, and
b¯ ≡ max{ b | b ∈ B }. Next define IA ≡ [a, a¯] and IB ≡ [b, b¯]. Because 1 /∈ A ∪ B,
balancedness implies a > 0 and b > 0. Assumption 2 ensures v1 and v2 are continu-
ous on IA × IB . Let (ak)∞k=1 be a countable dense subset of A with a1 = a and a2 = a¯.
Next define (bk)∞k=1 by bk = 1 − ak for all k. Because A and B are balanced, (bk)k
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is a dense subset of B. Next for every integer n ≥ 1, define An ≡ {a1, . . . , an} and
Bn ≡ {b1, . . . , bn}.
By Proposition 2, for each n ≥ 1 there exists a unique equilibrium (σ n1 , σ n2 ) such
that σ n1 is completely mixed over An and σ
n
2 is completely mixed over Bn . Because
S is compact, Fact 1 implies there exists a subsequence of (σ n1 , σ
n
2 )n that converges
weakly to a limit (σ 01 , σ
0
2 ), where σ
0
1 and σ 02 are probability measures on S. Without
loss of generality and to simplify notation, I take the original sequence (σ n1 , σ
n
2 )n to
converge to (σ 01 , σ
0
2 ). Note that the supports of (σ
n
1 )n and σ 01 are contained in IA and
the supports of (σ n2 )n and σ 02 are contained in IB .
To prove the proposition, it must be shown that
I. (σ 01 , σ
0
2 ) is an equilibrium and
II. supp(σ 01 ) = A and supp(σ 02 ) = B.
Subproof of I. Consider player 1. I will show
U1(σ 01 , σ
0
2 ) ≥ U1(s1, σ 02 ) ∀s1 ∈ S. (17)
The corresponding condition for player 2 is proven analogously. There are two cases:
(i) 1 − s1 is not an atom of σ 02 (i.e., σ 02 (1 − s1) = 0) and (ii) 1 − s1 is an atom of σ 02
(i.e., σ 02 (1 − s1) > 0).
Consider case (i): 1 − s1 is not an atom of σ 02 . Then, for every n,
U1(σ n1 , σ
n
2 ) ≥ U1(s1, σ n2 ) (18)
because (σ n1 , σ
n
2 ) is an equilibrium. Furthermore, u1 is upper-semicontinuous on IA ×
IB ,11 and on IB the only discontinuity of u1(s1, ·) occurs at s2 = 1 − s1, which is not
an atom of σ 02 . Therefore,
U1(σ 01 , σ
0
2 ) ≥ lim sup U1(σ n1 , σ n2 ) (Fact 2)
≥ lim sup U1(s1, σ n2 ) (by (18))
= lim U1(s1, σ n2 ) (Fact 3)
= U1(s1, σ 02 ), (Fact 3)
thus proving (17) holds in case (i).
Now consider case (ii): 1 − s1 is an atom of σ 02 . I prove by contradiction that (17)
must hold in this case too. Suppose to the contrary that (17) is not satisfied; that is,
11 A function h : X → R is upper-semicontinuous if for any α ∈ R the set {x ∈ X | h(x) < α} is open in
X . Now, for any α > 0,
{(s1, s2) ∈ IA × IB | u1(s1, s2) < α} = {(s1, s2) ∈ IA × IB | v1(s1, s2) < α} (*)∪{(s1, s2) ∈ IA × IB | s1 + s2 > 1}.
Because (0, 0) /∈ IA × IB , v1 is continuous on IA × IB ; therefore, both sets on the right-hand side of (*)
are open in IA × IB , and so too is their union. And for α ≤ 0, the left-hand side of (*) is just IA × IB .
Thus, u1 is upper-semicontinuous on IA × IB .
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2 ). Let (s
k
1 )k be a sequence such that s
k
1 → s1 and for any k,
sk1 < s1 and 1 − sk1 is not an atom of σ 02 . Then for all s2 ∈ S, u1(sk1 , s2) → u1(s1, s2)
as k → ∞. Therefore, by the Bounded Convergence Theorem [Chung (1974, p. 42)],
U1(sk1 , σ
0
2 ) → U1(s1, σ 02 ). Consequently, if U1(s1, σ 02 ) > U1(σ 01 , σ 02 ), then there
exists k′ such that sk′1 < s1, 1 − sk
′












but (19) contradicts case (i). Hence, it must be that (17) holds also in case (ii).
Analogous reasoning shows U2(σ 01 , σ
0
2 ) ≥ U1(σ 01 , s2) for all s2 ∈ S. Thus, part I
is proven.
Subproof of II. This is shown with two steps: (i) supp(σ 01 ) ⊂ A and (ii) supp(σ 01 ) ⊃
A.
Consider step (i). Let s1 ∈ S such that s1 /∈ A. Because A is closed, there exists
ε > 0 such that (s1 − ε, s1 + ε)∩ A = ∅ and such that s1 − ε and s1 + ε are not atoms
of σ 01 . Therefore,
σ 01 ((s1 − ε, s1 + ε)) = lim σ n1 ((s1 − ε, s1 + ε)) = 0,
where the first equality follows by weak convergence and the second because σ n1 ((s1−
ε, s1 + ε)) = 0 for every n. Thus, s1 /∈ supp(σ 01 ), so supp(σ 01 ) ⊂ A.
To establish step (ii), suppose to the contrary that ∃a0 ∈ A such that a0 /∈ supp(σ 01 ).
Because 1 /∈ A ∪ B and A and B are balanced, it follows that 0 < a0 < 1; therefore,
∃ε0 > 0 such that 0 < a0 −ε0 < a0 +ε < 1 and σ 01 ((a0 −ε0, a0 +ε0)) = 0. Because⋃
Ak is dense in A,∃a′ ∈ ⋃ Ak and ε > 0 such that (a′−ε, a′+ε) ⊂ (a0−ε0, a0+ε0)
and neither a′ −ε nor a′ +ε is an atom of σ 01 ; therefore, because σ n1
w−→ σ 01 , it follows
that
lim σ n1 ((a
′ − ε, a′ + ε)) = σ 01 ((a′ − ε, a′ + ε)) ≤ σ 01 ((a0 − ε0, a0 + ε0)) = 0.
(20)
Because the An sets are nested, there exists some n′ ≥ 2 such that a′ ∈ An for all
n ≥ n′. Observe that for all n ≥ n′,
0 < v2(a¯, 1 − a¯) ≤ U2(σ n1 , 1 − a¯) (Assumption 1(iii))




v2(s1, 1 − a′) dσ n1 (s1)
(1 − a′ ∈ Bn ∀n ≥ 2, and def. of U2)
≤ σ n1 ([a, a′]) v2(a, 1 − a′), (Assumption 1(iii))
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from which it follows that
σ n1 ([a, a′]) ≥
v2(a¯, 1 − a¯)






v2(s1, 1 − a′ + ε) − v2(s1, 1 − a′)
}
.
Assumptions 1(iii) and 2 imply  > 0. Next I show player 2 does better to demand
1 − a′ + ε than to play σ n2 when player 1 plays σ n1 . Suppose n ≥ n′; then





v2(s1, 1 − a′ + ε) − v2(s1, 1 − a′)
]




v2(s1, 1 − a′)dσ n1 (s1)
≥  × σ n1 ([a, a′ − ε]) − v2(a′ − ε, 1 − a′)σ n1 ((a′ − ε, a′]) (24)
=  × σ n1 ([a, a′]) −
(
 + v2(a′ − ε, 1 − a′)
)
σ n1 ((a
′ − ε, a′])
≥  × v2(a¯, 1 − a¯)
v2(a, 1 − a′) −
(
 + v2(a′ − ε, 1 − a′)
)
σ n1 ((a
′ − ε, a′])
(25)
−→  × v2(a¯, 1 − a¯)
v2(a, 1 − a′) as n → ∞ (26)
> 0. (27)
Here (22) follows because (σ n1 , σ n2 ) is an equilibrium with σ n2 (1−a′) > 0; (23) follows
from the definitions of U2 and u2; (24) follows from the definitions of  and Assump-
tion 1(iii); (25) follows from (21); (26) follows from (20); and (27) follows from (21)
and  > 0. Thus, for all n sufficiently large, U2(σ n1 , 1 − a′ + ε) > U2(σ n1 , σ n2 ),
which contradicts (σ n1 , σ
n
2 ) being an equilibrium. Hence, it must be the case that
supp(σ 01 ) ⊃ A. Steps (i) and (ii) now establish that supp(σ 01 ) = A; that is, σ 01 is
completely mixed over A.
Analogous reasoning shows σ 02 is completely mixed over B. Thus, part II is proven.unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let σ ∗i denote the mixed strategy associated with the cdf Fi
given in the proposition, i = 1, 2. Note that a point s ∈ S is an element of the support
of σ ∗i , and so too Fi , if and only if ∀ε > 0, Fi (s + ε) − Fi (s − ε) > 0.
Step 1: supp(σ ∗1 ) = A and supp(σ ∗2 ) = B.
I show A = supp(F1); the proof that B = supp(F2) is analogous. First suppose
s /∈ A. Because A is closed, ∃ε′ > 0 such that (s − 2ε′, s + 2ε′) ∩ A = ∅, imply-
ing F1(s + ε′) = F1(s − ε′), in turn implying F1(s + ε′) − F1(s − ε′) = 0. Thus,
s /∈ supp(F1), so supp(σ 01 ) ⊂ A.
Now suppose a ∈ A. Either a is an isolated point of A or it is not. If a is an isolated
point of A, then it is a jump point of F1 [Chung (1974, p. 10)] so that lims↑a F1(s) <
F1(a). Therefore, ∀ε > 0, F1(a + ε) − F1(a − ε) ≥ F1(a) − lims↑a F1(s) > 0,
implying a ∈ supp(F1). Now suppose a ∈ A is not an isolated point of A. Then
∀ε > 0, ∃ a(ε) ∈ A such that a(ε) = a and |a − a(ε)| < ε. Consequently,
F1(a + ε)−F1(a − ε) ≥ | F1(a)−F1(a(ε)) |=




where the inequality follows because w2 is strictly increasing and a = a(ε). Therefore,
a ∈ supp(F1), so supp(F1) ⊃ A. The foregoing cases show supp(F1) = A.
Step 2: if A and B are balanced, then (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is an equilibrium.
Suppose A and B are balanced. Because A and B are nonempty closed sets such
that 1 /∈ A ∪ B, balancedness implies a = 1 − b¯ > 0 and b = 1 − a¯ > 0. Consider
player 1’s situation. For player 1,
U1(a, σ ∗2 ) = w1(a)F2(1 − a) = w1(a)
(
w1(a)
w1(1 − (1 − a))
)
= w1(a) ∀a ∈ A.
To show σ ∗1 is a best response for player 1 to σ ∗2 being played by player 2, I next show
U1(s1, σ ∗2 ) < w1(a) ∀s1 /∈ A. (28)
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose s1 = s′ > a¯. Then ∀s2 ∈ B, s′ + s2 ≥
s′ + b > a¯ + b = 1, so U1(s′, σ ∗2 ) = 0 < w1(a). Second, suppose s1 = s′ such
that s′ /∈ A and s′ < a¯. Define a′ ≡ min{ a ∈ A | a > s′ }. Then a′ ∈ A, a′ > s′,
and [s′, a′) ∩ A = ∅; so balancedness of A and B implies (1 − a′, 1 − s′] ∩ B = ∅.
Therefore, F2(1 − s′) = F2(1 − a′) > 0, implying
w1(a) = U1(a′, σ ∗2 ) = w1(a′)F2(1 − a′)
> w1(s
′)F2(1 − a′) = w1(s′)F2(1 − s′)
= U1(s′, σ ∗2 ).
The two cases just discussed show (28) is satisfied. Thus, σ ∗1 is a best response for
player 1 to σ ∗2 being played by player 2; similarly, σ ∗2 can be shown to be a best
response for player 2 to σ ∗1 being played by player 1. Thus, (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is an equilibrium
in which σ ∗1 completely mixes over A and σ ∗2 completely mixes over B.
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Step 3: (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is the unique equilibrium in which player 1 completely mixes over A
and player 2 completely mixes over B.
Suppose (μ∗1, μ∗2) is any equilibrium in which μ∗1 completely mixes over A and μ∗2
completely mixes over B. Let G be the cdf associated with μ∗2. Recall that a probability
measure uniquely determines an associated cdf, and vice versa. First, I show G(b) =
F2(b) ∀b ∈ B. Observe that w1(a) = U1(a, μ∗2) = U1(a, μ∗2) = w1(a)G(1 − a)∀a ∈ A. Because A and B are balanced, with the change of variables b = 1 − a, I
rewrite this condition as
G(b) = w1(a)
w1(1 − b) ∀b ∈ B;
that is, G(b) = F2(b) ∀b ∈ B. Because F2 and G agree on B, σ ∗2 and μ∗2 agree on
all measurable subsets of B; in particular, μ∗2(B) = σ ∗2 (B) = 1. Because μ∗2 is a
probability measure, it therefore assigns no mass outside of B, agreeing with σ ∗2 . It
follows that the probability measures σ ∗2 and μ∗2 are identical. A symmetric argument
shows that μ∗1 is identical to σ ∗1 . unionsq
Example 8 [A continuous version of Roth’s example (Roth 1985)] Suppose v1 and
v2 are given by (3). Let a ∈ (0, 1/2) be given and define A ≡ [a, 1/2] and B ≡
[1/2, 1 − a]. The sets A and B are balanced. Consider strategies for players 1 and 2
given by the cdfs F1 and F2, respectively. Note that for s1, s2 with s1 + s2 ≤ 1 we have
vi (s1, s2) = 12 (1 + si − s j ), j = i , i = 1, 2. Now the expected payoff for player 1
using s1 ∈ A is given by
U1(s1, F2) = 12 F2(1/2)
(






(1 + s1 − s2) f2(s2) ds2
= s1 F2(1 − s1) + 12
1−s1∫
1/2
F2(s2) ds2. (integration by parts)
If player 1 is to be willing to randomize over [a, 1/2], it must be that over this interval





F2(1 − s1) − s1 f2(1 − s1),





2(1 − s2) .
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Accounting for the boundary condition F2(1−a) = 1, the solution to this differential




1 − s2 , ∀ s2 ∈ [1/2, 1 − a].
Similarly, player 1’s equilibrium strategy is found to be described by the cdf
F1(s1) = 1√2(1 − s1) , ∀ s1 ∈ [a, 1/2].
Thus, (F1, F2) constitutes an equilibrium in which player 1 completely mixes over
[a, 1/2] and player 2 completely mixes over [1/2, 1−a]. The probability of disagree-
























a + √1 − a√
2
,
which decreases from 0.2929 to 0 as a increases from 0 to 1/2. For all values of
a ∈ [0, 1/2) this probability of disagreement is less than in Roth’s discrete example,
Example 2 above. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5. First suppose 1 ∈ A and 1 /∈ B. Because 1 /∈ B, ∃ ε > 0 such
that (1 − 2ε, 1] ∩ B = ∅. Therefore, if player 1 announces demand ε, then players’
demands are sure to be compatible, so U1(ε, σ ∗2 ) = ε. Because (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) is an equilib-
rium, it follows that U1(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) ≥ U1(ε, σ ∗2 ) = ε > 0. Because 1 ∈ A, ∃(sk1 )k ⊂ S
such that sk1 → 1, sk1 < 1, and U1(sk1 , σ ∗2 ) = U1(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) for each k. Therefore,
0 < U1(ε, σ ∗2 ) ≤ lim U1(sk1 , σ ∗2 ) = lim sk1 F2(1 − sk1 ) = 1 × F2(0),
where the last equality follows from right-continuity of F2. Thus, F2(0) > 0; that is, 0 is
an atom of F2. Because 0 is an atom of F2, it follows that U2(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) = U2(σ ∗1 , 0) = 0,
which in turn implies that player 1 demands 1 with probability 1. To see this, observe
that
0 = U2(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) ≥ U2(σ ∗1 , s) = s F1(1 − s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ (0, 1],
implying F1(s) = 0 for all s < 1; hence, σ ∗1 (1) = 1. An analogous argument proves
part 2.
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Finally suppose 1 ∈ A ∩ B. If σ ∗2 (1) = 1 the proof is done; so suppose σ ∗2 (1) < 1.
Then ∃ε > 0 such that σ ∗2 ((1 − 2ε, 1]) < 1. If player 1 demands ε, then
U1(ε, σ ∗2 ) = εF2(1 − ε) ≥ εF2(1 − 2ε) = ε (1 − σ(1 − 2ε, 1])) > 0.
Consequently, it must be that player 1’s equilibrium payoff is positive, U1(σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) > 0.
The proof is completed as for part 1, showing that 0 must be an atom of σ ∗2 , which
implies that player 2’s equilibrium payoff is 0, and thus player 1 demands 1 for sure.
The details are omitted. unionsq
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